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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF' "'l!E S'l'ATE OF U"'AH 
M1ERICAN COAL CO., EMERY MINING 
CORP, , and STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-v-
TERRY W. SANDSTROM, INDUSTRIAL 
COM1'1ISSION OF UTAH, and SECOND 
INJURY FUND, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 19134 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE OF CASE 
ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs State Insurance Fund and American Coal Comoany 
brought this appeal to determine whether the 1981 amendments 
to Utah Code Ann., § 35-1-69, allow an emoloyer anc'. its compensation 
carrier to recoup sums expended for temporary total compensation 
and medical benefits expended prior to an applicant's stabilization 
but attributable to pre-existing conditions. The parties stipulated 
before the Industrial Commission that the applicant in this case, 
Terry Sandstrom, had a 20% permanent partial imoairment to his 
back from all causes, of which 10% was attributable to pre-
existing conditions and 10% was attributable to the industrial 
injury which brought the applicant before the Commission (R. 39, 43). 
The plaintiff, at hearing and in a motion for review before the 
Tndustrial Commission, preserved the issue of its entitlement to 
reimbursement for monies expended in temporary total compensation 
dnd medical benefits prior to the aoplicant's stabilization. 
The Attorney General's Office, in n' t'oe Industrial 
Commission anct the SC'rnnd Injury Funct. f ilcd a hr10f in resoonse 
(hereinafter "Commission Brief"). The hr1cf was siqnect by an 
Assistant Attorney General and, as will be oointed out later, 
raises issues which were not raised in olaintiff's aooeal or 
by a cross-appeal. The Commission Brief asks that this Court 
overturn the Commission's findings that Utah Code Ann., 
§ 35-1-99 (statute of limitations provision) does not anply to 
claims against the Second Injury Funct. 
Thus, the Commission is asking this Court to overturn the 
Commission's own findings. Later, a Respondents' Brief' was 
filed on behalf of the Second Injury Fund only (hereinafter 
"Second Injury Fund Brief") asking that the order of the 
Industrial Commission be affirmed. 
Plaintiffs are now in a position to reoly. 
ARGUMENT I 
REPLY TO THE POSITION OF T!IE INDUSTRIAL C0MMISSION, 
The Commission Brief misinterprets all of the anolicable law 
from this Court on the Second Injury Fund and raises issues not 
properly raised in this appeal. The Statement of Facts contained 
in the Commission Brief is confusinq and inaccurate. There was 
a settlement agreement entered into by the State Insurance Funn. 
Second Injury Fund, and Mr. Sandstrom agreeinq that Mr. Sandstrom 
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suffered permanent partial disability of 20%, 10% of which 
was attributable to the industrial accident for which plaintiff 
was liable, and 10% which was attributable to pre-existing 
conditions (conditions which in this case resulted from prior 
industrial accidents which were not CQlllPensated or were not 
actionable at the time the claim was brought) (R. 39, 43, 95, 
212). The claim in the Commission Brief that Utah Code Ann., 
§ 35-1-99 should be applied to bar claims against the Second 
Injury Fund is an issue neither preserved in motion for review 
nor in a petition for a writ of review before this Court, and 
should be disregarded. 
The argument in the Commission Brief that the order of 
the Commission is supported by substantial evidence clearly shows 
a lack of understanding of the claims of plaintiffs on aPoeal. 
The cases cited in the Commission Brief (p. 4) all address the 
scope of this Court's review of findings of the Industrial 
Commission. Plaintiffs are not claiming here that the findings 
of fact of the Industrial Commission are without substantial 
evidence in the record. Rather, plaintiffs' claim is that 
the Commission misapplied the statutory language of Utah Code 
Ann., § 35-1-69 (1953, as amended 1981). '!'herefore, that 
argument in the Commission's Brief goes to no issue before 
this Court. 
The second argument in the ComMission's Brief is the 
, "'I y argument going to the merits of this appeal, and clearly 
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takes this Court to task for irnproncrly rcwritinq thP law 
regarding the Second In1ury Funrl. It is verv aoparent from 
reading the interpretations given in the Brief 
to the cases, beginning with McPhie v. United States Steel Co., 
551 P.2d 504 (Utah 1976) and Intermountain Health Care Inc. v. 
Ortega, 562 P.2d 617 (Utah 1977) applying the Second In1ury 
Fund law in this State, that the respondents disagree with this 
Court's application of Utah Code Ann., § 35-1-69. Describing 
that line of cases, the Corrunission Brief states: 
One of the severe changes was in giving reim-
bursement to the insurance carrier for medical 
expenses and temporary total disability 
compensation. 
(Brief, p. 5). This argument shows an absolute lack of unrlerstand;· 
of the underlying reasons for the Second Injury Fund enactment 
which this Court has so clearly stated in both McPhie and Orteqa. 
Those cases hold that the purpose of the statutory orovisions in 
Utah Code Ann., § 35-1-69 are to encourage employers to hire 
workers with pre-existing incapacities or disabilities. The 
Commission Brief further claims that the legislative intent 
behind the 1981 amendments to that Section was to "bring hack 
some logic to this direction forced upon the Co1TU'1ission•· (p. 5) 
(presumably by this Court) . This statement clearly ooints out 
the present conflict built into the structure of arlrninistration 
of the Utah Second Injury Fund, an issue which will be discusseri 
later. 
The legislative intent argument in the Commission Brief 
is an insult to the integrity of the aopellate orocess. The 
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lectures this Court on the intent the Advisory 
Cr>uncil for the Industrial Commission had for the 1981 amend-
rnPnts, but that position has absolutely no support in the 
record and no basis in legislative history. 
Finally, the Commission Brief argues that settlement was 
reached by the parties on July 30, 1983, to which Second Injury 
Fund was not made a party. Provisions of the record cited in 
plaintiffs' brief and in the brief of defendant Second Iniury 
Fund (p. 3) clearly show that the applicant, the State Insurance 
Fund, and the Second Injury Fund were all parties to the settle-
ment, and both the Second Injury Fund and the Stnte Insurance 
Fund knew that the issue of reimbursement for temporary total 
compensation and medical benefits was an issue being preserved 
for the appeal process. The settlement orovided that the 
applicant could be paid what he was clearly entitled to be 
paid under the statutory provisions, and the rights of the 
employer to reimbursement would not hamper the applicant's 
right to compensation. Again, this respondent's clear 
misunderstanding of the record adds nothing but confusion to 
the matter before this Court. 
ARGUMENT II 
THE POSITION OF DEFENDANT SECOND INJURY FUND 
FAILS TO PRESERVE THE UNDERLYING LFr,ISLATIVE 
INTENT OF UTAH CODE ANN., § 35-1-69. 
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The 1981 amendments to Utah Code .. § 35-1-69 are shown 
in Appendix A to the Second In1ury Fund's brief, and the first 
three paragraphs are set out here for the Court's convenience. 
35-1-69. Combined injuries resultinq 
in permanent incapacity - Payment out of 
second injury fund - Training of employee. 
(1) If any employee who has Previously incurred 
a permanent incapacity by accidental in1ury, 
disease, or congenital causes, sustains an industrial 
injury for which either compensation and or medical 
care, or both, is provided by this title that 
results in permanent incapacity which is 
substantially greater than he would have incurred 
if he had not had the pre-existing incapacity, 
or which aggravates or is aggravated by such 
pre-existing incapacity, compensation medical 
care, wn±en-med±eai-eare and other related items 
are as outlined in section 35-1-81, shall be 
awarded on the basis of the combined in1uries, 
but the liability of the employer for such 
compensation and medical care, and other related 
items shall be for the industrial injury only 
and the remainder shall be Paid out of the 
special second injury fund provided for in section 
35-1-68(1) 
£ttndll. 
For purposes of this section, (a) anv 
aggravation of a pre-existing injury, disease 
or congenital cause shall be deemed "substan-
tially greater", and compensation, medical 
care, and other related items shall be awarded 
on the basis of the combined injuries as Provided 
above, provided, however, that (b) where there 
is no such aggravation, no award for combined 
injuries shall be made unless the percentage 
of permanent physical impairment attributable 
to the industrial injury is 10% or greater 
and the percentage of Permanent Physical 
impairment resulting from all causes and 
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including the industrial in1ury, 
is greater than 20%. Where the ore-existing 
incapacity referred to in subsection (1) (b) 
of this section previously has been compensated 
for, in whole or in oart, as a oermanent oartial 
disability under this act or the Utah Occuoational 
Disease Disability Law, such comoensation shall 
be deducted from the liability assessed to the 
second injury fund under this oaragraoh. 
Where the payment of temporary cUsability 
benefits, medical exoenses, or other related 
items are required as a result of the industrial 
injury subject to this section, the employer or 
its insurance carrier shall be responsible for 
all such temporary benefits, medical care, or 
other related items up to the end of the neriod 
of temporary total disability resulting from 
the industrial injury. Any allocation of 
disability benefits, medical care, or other 
related items following such oeriod shall he 
made between the employer or its insurer and the 
second in1ury fund as orovided for herein, and 
any payments made by the employer or its insurance 
carrier in excess of its oroPortionate share 
shall be recoverable at the time of the award 
for combined d.isabilities if any is made 
hereunder. 
It is the contention of the plaintiffs that the plain meaning of 
the first paragraoh of this orovision controls interpretation of 
the remainder of the Section. After defining what a pre-existing 
in1ury is in the first Paragraph, the leqislation goes on to 
state: 
the liability of the employer for such 
compensation, medical care, and other 
related items shall be for the industrial 
injury only and the remainder shall be . 
paid out of the second injury fund Provided 
for in Section 35-1-68 (1) (emohasis added). 
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The plain meaning of that section must be read as conqruent 
with the plain meaning of the third paragraph, relied unon 
by the Second Injury Fund, which states: 
Where the payment of temporary disability 
benefits, medical expenses or other related 
items are required as a result of the industrial 
injury subject to this section, the employer or 
its insurance carrier shall be responsible For 
all such temporary benefits, medical care, or 
other related items up to the end of the period 
of temporary total disability resulting from 
the industrial injury. Any allocation or disability 
benefits, medical care, or other related items 
following such a period shall be made between 
the employer or its insurer and the second injury 
fund as provided herein, and any Payments made 
by the employer or its insurance carrier in 
excess of its proportionate share shall be 
recoverable at the time of the award ror combined 
disability if any is made hereunder (emphasis 
added). 
As stated in plaintiff's earlier brief, the Plain meaning of 
this language is that the employer and insurance carrier are in 
no way liable for funds expended for temporary total compensation, 
medical expenses, permanent partial disability, or other related 
items which are not a result of the industrial in1ury. Therefore, 
for the provision that the carrier be responsible to the end of 
the period of temporary total disability to make sense in the 
context of the section, it must be interpreted as requiring the 
employer or its insurance carrier to pay the aPplicant's medical 
expenses and benefits upon which to live, but the Proviso 
that once the determination of combined disability is made, the 
employer is allowed to recover that percentage of amounts oair 
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in temporary total compensation and medical benefits that are 
not attributable to the industrial injury. Not only does this 
interpretation provide a consistent reading of all the language 
cJf the section, but it clearly meets the underlying purcose of 
the statute to spread the risk among all employers of hiring 
or retaining workers with pre-existing conditions. Clearly, the 
more significant a pre-existing condition, the more risk an employer 
has that subsequent aggravation will result in an extensive period 
of temporary total disability and more costly medical care. To 
say as does the Second Injury Fund, that it is the Plain meaning 
of the statutory language that such risks should be borne by 
employer rather than apread broadly through the Second Injury 
Fund is to ignore the underlying purpose of the statute. 
Before the enactment of the 1981 a!'lendrnents there was 
incentive for employers and their insurance carriers to deny 
liability where it appeared that a significant amount of the 
disability was a result of some pre-existing condition. Such 
a denial meant the applicant did not receive benefits, even though 
all parties recognized that the applicant was due the comoensation. 
Plaintiffs' interpret the Legislature's intent in changing Utah 
Code Ann., § 35-1-69 to require that the employer mRke payments 
during the initial period of disability and/or receive reimburse-
ment for amounts not attributable to the industrial injury. Such 
interpretation is more congruent with the underlying purpose 
of the statute than the interpretation urged by the Second Injury 
F' 11nrl. 
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Finally, the Second Iniury Fund's hriPf relies on statenents 
made during the Senate debate on the bill which resulteri in all 
of the changes cited above to Section 6Q. The Seconrl Iniurv 
Fund brief emphasizes comments maoe by Senator Cornahy stating 
that the purpose of the bill was "to nore equitably allocate the 
compensation for workmen's injuries between the funn anr the 
insurance companies." In Appendix B attached to the Second Iniun 
Fund brief, a transcript of the entire proceeding is contained, 
and Senator Cornaby goes on to state: 
It is a fairly technical item, 
it is fairly straightforward. 
any questions, I would be glad 
respond to them, if not I call 
question. 
but I think 
If there are 
to try to 
for the 
(See Second Injury Fund Brief, Apoendix B, p. 2). An examination 
of the entire amendatory language made to Section 69 bv the 
1981 Legislature reveals the second paragraph of Section 69 was 
revised in great detail to define situations where pre-existing 
injury, disease, or congenital problems should be deemed to 
make an applicant's impairment "substantially qreater". That 
paragraph's definition of what is to be rletermined "substantially 
greater" is of major impact on the allocation of benefits 
between employers and the Second Injury Fund, and does appear to 
be a highly technical amendment as Senator Cornaby innicated 
in the transcript of the debate on the Senate floor. There 
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was no indication, however, in any of the debate cited in the 
Senate argument which would show a desire on the Part of the 
f,pg is la ture to change the underlying purpose of the statute. 
l!owcver, the interpretation of the amendments made by the 
Corrunission placing the entire burden for the initial period 
of total disability and attendant medical expenses on the 
employer substantially alters the underlying purpose of the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann., § 35-1-69. 
ARGUMENT I II 
FAILURE OF THE COMMISSION TO .Zl_WARD RFIMBURSEMENT 
TO THE PLAINTIFFS WAS PROMPTED BY BIAS AND WAS 
A DENIAL OF PLAINTIFFS' RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL 
HEARING. 
This Court has long held that all parties before the 
Corrunission are entitled to a fair and impartial hearing, See 
Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 
66 U. 600 245 P. 343, 346 (1926). Recently this Court held 
that in order for the Second In1ury Fund to be protected, 
it should have notice of actions affecting the Fund, a right 
to present evidence, and the right to object to findings of the 
Cor.imission; Paoli v. Cottonwood Hospital, 656 P.2d 420 (Utah 1982). 
Because Utah Code Ann., § 35-1-68, 69 (1953, as amended 1981) 
provides for a "Fund" to be administered by the Commission, the 
Commission is able to decide on an interpretation of the appli-
rable statutes and impose that interpretation on both the 
::.idministration of the fund and the adjudication of claims against 
-11-
the fund. In order for this Court to give effect to the language 
in Paoli, li.:_, at 422 stating: 
To implement the legislative intent as we have 
interpreted and applied it, the Second In1urv 
Fund needs to have independent 
direction within the Industrial Commission 
from some official not responsible for the 
adjudicative functions of the Commission 
that "direct its distribution", 
the Commission's interpretation of the statutory Provisions 
governing the Fund should be strictly scrutinized; or this Court 
should declare that the Commission's conflict between administratioc 
of the Fund and adjudication of its liability denies other parties 
appearing before the Commission due process of law and eaual 
protection of the laws provided for in both the Constitution of 
the United States, Amendment V and XIV(81) and the Constitution of 
Utah, Article 1, §§ 7 and 24. During a Period of time when the 
Utah State Insurance Fund was administered bv the Commission, 
this Court ref used to order they be separated to afford oarties 
a fair and impartial hearing; Ellis v. Industrial Commission, 
91 U. 432 64 P.2d 363 (Utah 1937). However, during the time 
such structure existed this Court found that the Utah State 
Insurance Fund was not a legally cognizable entity and could 
not prosecute an action to contest a Commission award; See 
Ban & Kariya Co. v. Industrial Commission, 67 U. 301, 247 P. 
490 (1926). 
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Justice Straub, citing Ban & Kariya approvingly, pointed 
out the difficulty when the Col'lmission has adjudicatory Power 
'Jver an entity it administers: 
The fund itself is under the exclusive 
management and control of the commission. 
It is given power to make and it makes all 
contracts with respect thereto, including the 
issuing of all policies of insurance payable 
out of the fund. The commissioner has what 
is called a manager of the fund and a claim 
adjuster who are apoointed bv the commission 
and who are subject to the control 
and direction of the commission. It, among 
other things, is the dutv of the manaqer and 
the claim adjuster to investigate all. alleged 
claims for compensation payable out of "The 
State Insurance Fund" and to report the result 
of their investigation to the commission, and, 
if in their judgment the claim is unmeritorious, 
to resist its payment; and, where aoplications 
for compensation are made oayable out of the 
state insurance fund, the commission employs, 
and here employed, counsel to represent "The 
State Insurance Fund" to resist payment of 
the claim. Counsel so employed also like the 
manager and claim adjuster are subject to the 
control and direction of the commission . 
I refer to such proceedings as I have only 
for the purpose of showing that, whenever a 
tribunal, whether a judge, court, board, or 
other body, sits in judgment in a cause or 
controversy in which it is either directly or 
indirectly interested, and where it employs 
counsel to resist the claim, it is but natural 
for it as triers of fact to look with more 
or less favor to what is adduced or represented 
in harmony with its interests, and with more 
or less scrutinv or disfavor to what is adduced 
or represented against such interests or at least 
is ant to do so. I do not say such is the case 
in all instances, for there may be instances 
where a judge, court, board, or other body so 
situated and being conscious of the situation, 
may be 1 uenced to "lean backwards"; and it may 
be that in some instances the board may have 
made awards payable out of the state insurance 
fund when the making of them may have been 
doubtful or even unwarranted . 
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That such conditions or situation has a 
natural tendency and is calculated to affect 
and influence a consideration of evidence 
may not well be doubted; and for such and other 
reasons it is the qeneral rule that no tribunal 
ought or is per1'1itted to sit in iudqment in 
any case or controversy in which it is either 
directly or indirectly interested. But, as 
heretofore indicated, it is not the fault of 
the commission that it in such cases so sits 
in judgment. Under the statute it is required 
to do so. Nevertheless, because the commission, 
in a case involving the state insurance fund 
over which it has the exclusive manaqement 
and control and in effect is a contracting party 
every time it writes an insurance policy payable 
out of the state insurance fund, and whatever 
award is made is payable out of such fund, so 
is required to sit in judgment, demands, as I 
think, a closer scrutiny and consideration of 
its findings and of the evidence than in other 
cases where it is not so interested and not a 
party to the cause (emphasis added) . 
Hawser v. Industrial Commission, 296 P. 780, 786-87 (1931) (cited 
in dissent). Justice Straub in Hawser clearly points out the 
difficulty created when the adjudicator of a claim has administrati 
control over the fund which the claim is against. Emo loyers 
their compensation carriers are equally concerned today over 
administration of the Second Injury Fund by the Commission. 
very least the Court should do is hold the Commission's interpre-
tation of statutes involving the Second Iniury Fund under the light 
of strict scrutiny. The more appropriate solution to quarantee 
that applicants, employer and compensation insurers are afforded 
an impartial, unbiased hearinq of their cause or defense is to 
declare that for the Commission to adjudicate compensation 
claims and also administer a fund against which claims are 
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3sserted is to deny all parties their rights to due process 
,,f law and equal protection of the laws, and to require the 
Legislature to devise a structure that avoids such bias. 
CONCLUSION 
The 1981 amendments to Utah Code Ann., § 35-1-69, clearly 
intended to provide that an applicant is paid temporary total 
compensation while that applicant is undergoing the initial 
healing period, and to also determine that his medical payments 
are paid during that period of time. However, the Legislature 
also intended in those amendments to make certain that the 
employer pays up to, but not exceeding, its fair share of all 
temporary total compensation, medical benefits, permanent 
partial disability, and is entitled to recover any amounts 
paid in excess of that during any neriod of time. Such an 
interpretation of those amendments clearly nrotects the 
applicant's rights, and also promotes the purpose of this 
statute to encourage employers to hire and retain individuals 
with pre-existing conditions. 
Failure of the Utah State Industrial Commission to 
interpret these amendments in this manner and to award 
reimbursement to the Utah State Insurance Fund from the 
Second Injury Fund for one-half of Mr. Sandstrom's temporary 
-15-
total compensation and medical benefits paid to the Cl.ate 
of stabilization is clearly a misapplication of the law in 
this case. It was done because of its bias in favor of the 
Second Injury Fund and in direct denial of the employer's and 
State Insurance Fund's right to a fair and impartial hearing 
on this issue. 
For these reasons this Court should reverse the Industrial 
Corrunission's order disallowing reimbursement to the enployer 
for temporary total compensation and medical benefits paid prior 
to Mr. Sandstrom's stabilization, but which were attributable to 
Mr. Sandstrom's pre-existing injuries. 
DATED day of February, 1984. 
BLACK & MOORE 
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